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ABSTRACT
Two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) has become sig-
nificantly more feasible, even on resource-constrained de-
vices, because of advances in server-aided computation sys-
tems. However, there are still bottlenecks, particularly in the
input validation stage of a computation. Moreover, SFE re-
search has not yet devoted sufficient attention to the impor-
tant problem of retaining state after a computation has been
performed so that expensive processing does not have to be
repeated if a similar computation is done again. This paper
presents PartialGC, an SFE system that allows the reuse of
encrypted values generated during a garbled-circuit compu-
tation. We show that using PartialGC can reduce computa-
tion time by as much as 96% and bandwidth by as much as
98% in comparison with previous outsourcing schemes for
secure computation. We demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach with two sets of experiments, one in which the
garbled circuit is evaluated on a mobile device and one in
which it is evaluated on a server. We also use PartialGC
to build a privacy-preserving “friend finder” application for
Android. The reuse of previous inputs to allow stateful eval-
uation represents a new way of looking at SFE and further
reduces computational barriers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure function evaluation, or SFE, allows multiple parties
to jointly compute a function while maintaining input and
output privacy. The two-party variant, known as 2P-SFE,
was first introduced by Yao in the 1980s [39] and was largely
a theoretical curiosity. Developments in recent years have
made 2P-SFE vastly more efficient [18, 27, 38]. However,
computing a function using SFE is still usually much slower
than doing so in a non-privacy-preserving manner. Garbled
circuits, described by Yao, are a powerful mechanism for
performing SFE, with modern variants allowing malicious
security for complex programs.
As mobile devices become more powerful and ubiquitous,
users expect more services to be accessible through them.
When SFE is performed on mobile devices (where resource
constraints are tight), it is extremely slow – if the com-
putation can be run at all without exhausting the mem-
ory, which can happen for non-trivial input sizes and algo-
rithms [8]. One way to allow mobile devices to perform SFE
is to use a server-aided computational model [8, 22], allow-
ing the majority of an SFE computation to be “outsourced”
to a more powerful device while still preserving privacy. Past
approaches, however, have not considered the ways in which
mobile computation differs from the desktop. Often, the mo-
bile device is called upon to perform incremental operations
that are continuations of a previous computation.
Consider, for example, a friend finder application where
the location of users is updated periodically to determine
whether a contact is in proximity. Traditional applications
disclose location information to a central server. A privacy-
preserving friend finder could perform these operations in a
mutually oblivious fashion. However, every incremental lo-
cation update would require a full re-evaluation of the func-
tion with fresh inputs in a standard SFE solution. Our ex-
amination of an outsourced SFE scheme for mobile devices
by Carter et al. [8] (hereon CMTB), determined that the
cryptographic consistency checks performed on the inputs
to an SFE computation themselves can constitute the great-
est bottleneck to performance.
Additionally, many other applications require the ability
to save state, a feature that current garbled circuit imple-
mentations do not possess. The ability to save state and
reuse an intermediate value from one garbled circuit execu-
tion to another would be useful in many other ways, e.g., we
could split a large computation into a number of smaller
pieces. Combined with efficient input validation, this be-
comes an extremely attractive proposition.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to reuse an en-
crypted value in an outsourced SFE computation (we use
a cut-and-choose garbled circuit protocol) even if one is re-
stricted to primitives that are part of standard garbled cir-
cuits. Our system, PartialGC, which is based on CMTB,
provides a way to take encrypted output wire values from
one SFE computation, save them, and then reuse them as
input wires in a new garbled circuit. Our method vastly re-
duces the number of cryptographic operations compared to
the trivial mechanism of simply XOR’ing the results with a
one-time pad, which requires either generating inside the cir-
cuit, or inputting, a very large one-time pad, both complex
operations. Through the use of improved input validation
mechanisms proposed by shelat and Shen [38] (hereon sS13)
and new methods of partial input gate checks and evalu-
ation, we improve on previous proposals. There are other
approaches to the creation of reusable garbled circuits [13,
10, 5], and previous work on reusing encrypted values in the
ORAM model [30, 11, 31], but these earlier schemes have
not been implemented. By contrast, we have implemented
our scheme and found it to be both practical and efficient;
we provide a performance analysis and a sample application
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Figure 1: PartialGC Overview. E is evaluator and G is gen-
erator. The blue box is a standard execution that produces
partial outputs (garbled values); yellow boxes represent exe-
cutions that take partial inputs and produce partial outputs.
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Figure 2: Our system has three parties. Only the cloud and
generator have to save intermediate values - this means that
we can have different phones in different computations.
to illustrate its feasibility (Section 6), as well as a simplified
example execution (Appendix C).
By breaking a large program into smaller pieces, our sys-
tem allows interactive I/O throughout the garbled circuit
computation. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
practical protocol for performing interactive I/O in the mid-
dle of a cut-and-choose garbled circuit computation.
Our system comprises three parties - a generator, an eval-
uator, and a third party (“the cloud”), to which the evaluator
outsources its part of the computation. Our protocol is se-
cure against a malicious adversary, assuming that there is
no collusion by either party with the cloud. We also provide
a semi-honest version of the protocol.
Figure 1 shows how PartialGC works at a high level: First,
a standard SFE execution (blue) takes place, at the end of
which we“save”some intermediate output values. All further
executions use intermediate values from previous executions.
In order to reuse these values, information from both parties
– the generator and the evaluator – has to be saved. In our
protocol, it is the cloud – rather than the evaluator – that
saves information. This allows multiple distinct evaluators
to participate in a large computation over time by saving
state in the cloud between different garbled circuit execu-
tions. For example, in a scenario where a mobile phone is
outsourcing computation to a cloud, PartialGC can save the
encrypted intermediate outputs to the cloud instead of the
phone (Figure 2). This allows the phones to communicate
with each other by storing encrypted intermediate values in
the cloud, which is more efficient than requiring them to
directly participate in the saving of values, as required by
earlier 2P-SFE systems. Our friend finder application, built
for an Android device, reflects this usage model and allows
multiple friends to share their intermediate values in a cloud.
Other friends use these saved values to check whether or not
someone is in the same map cell as themselves without hav-
ing to copy and send data.
By incorporating our optimizations, we give the following
contributions:
1. Reusable Encrypted Values – We show how to reuse an
encrypted value, using only garbled circuits, by mapping
one garbled value into another.
2. Reduced Runtime and Bandwidth – We show how reusable
encrypted values can be used in practice to reduce the
execution time for a garbled-circuit computation; we get
a 96% reduction in runtime and a 98% reduction in band-
width over CMTB. Impressively, we can reduce the amount
of bandwidth required by the mobile party arbitrarily
when no input checks have to be performed on the partial
(intermediate) inputs in our protocol.
3. Outsourcing Stateful Applications – We show how our sys-
tem increases the scope of SFE applications by allowing
multiple evaluating parties over a period of time to op-
erate on the saved state of an SFE computation without
the need for these parties to know about each other.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides some background on SFE. Section 3 introduces the
concept of partial garbled circuits in detail. The PartialGC
protocol and its implementation are described in Section 4,
while its security is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 evalu-
ates PartialGC and introduces the friend finder application.
Section 7 discusses related work and Section 8 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
Secure function evaluation (SFE) addresses scenarios where
two or more mutually distrustful parties P1, . . . , Pn, with
private inputs x1, . . . , xn, want to compute a given function
yi = f(x1, . . . , xn) (yi is the output received by Pi), such
that no Pi learns anything about any xj or yj , i 6= j that is
not logically implied by xi and yi. Moreover, there exists no
trusted third party – if there was, the Pis could simply send
their inputs to the trusted party, which would evaluate the
function and return the yis.
SFE was first proposed in the 1980s in Yao’s seminal pa-
per [39]. The area has been studied extensively by the cryp-
tography community, leading to the creation of the first gen-
eral purpose platform for SFE, Fairplay [32] in the early
2000s. Today, there exist many such platforms [6, 9, 16, 17,
26, 37, 40].
The classic platforms for 2P-SFE, including Fairplay, use
garbled circuits. A garbled circuit is a Boolean circuit which
is encrypted in such a way that it can be evaluated when
the proper input wires are entered. The party that evaluates
this circuit does not learn anything about what any partic-
ular wire represents. In 2P-SFE, the two parties are: the
generator, which creates the garbled circuit, and the evalua-
tor, which evaluates the garbled circuit. Additional crypto-
graphic techniques are used for input and output; we discuss
these later.
A two-input Boolean gate has four truth table entries. A
two-input garbled gate also has a truth table with four en-
tries representing 1s and 0s, but these entries are encrypted
and can only be retrieved when the proper keys are used.
The values that represent the 1s and 0s are random strings
of bits. The truth table entries are permuted such that the
evaluator cannot determine which entry she is able to de-
crypt, only that she is able to decrypt an entry. The entirety
of a garbled gate is the four encrypted output values.
Each garbled gate is then encrypted in the following way:
Each entry in the truth table is encrypted under the two
input wires, which leads to the result, truthi = Enc(inputx||
inputy)⊕outputi, where truthi is a value in the truth table,
inputx is the value of input wire x, inputy is the value of
input wire y, and outputi is the non-encrypted value, which
represents either 0 or 1.We use AES as the Enc function.
If the evaluator has inputx and inputy, then she can also
receive outputi, and the encrypted truth tables are sent to
her for evaluation.
For the evaluator’s input, 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers
(OTs) [1, 20, 34, 35] are used. In a 1-out-of-2 OT, one party
offers up two possible values while the other party selects
one of the two values without learning the other. The party
that offers up the two values does not learn which value was
selected. Using this technique, the evaluator gets the wire
labels for her input without leaking information.
The only way for the evaluator to get a correct output
value from a garbled gate is to know the correct decryption
keys for a specific entry in the truth table, as well as the
location of the value she has to decrypt.
During the permutation stage, rather than simply ran-
domly permuting the values, the generator permutes values
based on a specific bit in inputx and inputy, such that, given
inputx and inputy the evaluator knows that the location of
the entry to decrypt is bitx ∗ 2 + bity. These bits are called
the permutation bits, as they show the evaluator which en-
try to select based on the permutation; this optimization,
which does not leak any information, is known as point and
permute [32].
2.1 Threat Models
Traditionally, there are two threat models discussed in
SFE work, semi-honest and malicious. The above description
of garbled circuits is the same in both threat models. In
the semi-honest model users stay true to the protocol but
may attempt to learn extra information from the system
by looking at any message that is sent or received. In the
malicious model, users may attempt to change anything with
the goal of learning extra information or giving incorrect
results without being detected; extra techniques must be
added to achieve security against a malicious adversary.
There are several well-known attacks a malicious adver-
sary could use against a garbled circuit protocol. A protocol
secure against malicious adversaries must have solutions to
all potential pitfalls, described in turn:
Generation of incorrect circuits: If the generator does not
create a correct garbled circuit, he could learn extra infor-
mation by modifying truth table values to output the eval-
uator’s input; he is limited only by the external structure of
the garbled circuit the evaluator expects.
Selective failure of input: If the generator does not offer
up correct input wires to the evaluator, and the evaluator
selects the wire that was not created properly, the generator
can learn up to a single bit of information based on whether
the computation produced correct outputs.
Input consistency: If either party’s input is not consistent
across all circuits, then it might be possible for extra infor-
mation to be retrieved.
Output consistency: In the two-party case, the output con-
sistency check verifies that the evaluator did not modify the
generator’s output before sending it.
2.1.1 Non-collusion
CMTB assumes non-collusion, as quoted below:
“The outsourced two-party SFE protocol securely computes
a function f(a,b) in the following two corruption scenarios:
(1)The cloud is malicious and non-cooperative with respect
to the rest of the parties, while all other parties are semi-
honest, (2)All but one party is malicious, while the cloud is
semi-honest.”
This is the standard definition of non-collusion used in
server-aided works such as Kamara et al. [22]. Non-collusion
does not mean the parties are trusted; it only means the
two parties are not working together in order to cheat. In
CMTB, any individual party that attempts to cheat to gain
additional information will still be caught, but collusion be-
tween multiple parties could leak information. For instance,
the generator could send the cloud the keys to decrypt the
circuit and see what the intermediate values are of the gar-
bled function.
3. PARTIAL GARBLED CIRCUITS
We introduce the concept of partial garbled circuits (PGCs),
which allows the encrypted wire outputs from one SFE com-
putation to be used as inputs to another. This can be ac-
complished by mapping the encrypted output wire values to
valid input wire values in the next computation. In order to
better demonstrate their structure and use, we first present
PGCs in a semi-honest setting, before showing how they can
aid us against malicious adversaries.
3.1 PGCs in the Semi-Honest Model
In the semi-honest model, for each wire value, the gen-
erator can simply send two values to the evaluator, which
transforms the wire label the evaluator owns to work in an-
other garbled circuit. Depending on the point and permute
bit of the wire label received by the evaluator, she can map
the value from a previous garbled circuit computation to a
valid wire label in the next computation.
Specifically, for a given wire pair, the generator has wires
wt−10 and w
t−1
1 , and creates wires w
t
0 and w
t
1. Here, t refers
to a particular computation in a series, while 0 and 1 cor-
respond to the values of the point and permute bits of the
t− 1 values. The generator sends the values wt−10 ⊕ wt0 and
wt−11 ⊕ wt1 to the evaluator. Depending on the point and
permute bit of the wt−1i value she possesses, the evaluator
selects the correct value and then XORs her wt−1i with the
(wt−1i ⊕ wti) value, thereby giving her wti , the valid partial
input wire.
3.2 PGCs in the Malicious Model
In the malicious model we must allow the evaluation of a
circuit with partial inputs and verification of the mappings,
while preventing a selective failure attack. The following fea-
tures are necessary to accomplish these goals:
Verifiable Mapping: The generator G is able to create a se-
cure mapping from a saved garbled wire value into a new
computation that can be checked by the evaluator E, with-
out E being able to reverse the mapping. During the evalua-
tion and check phase, E must be able to verify the mapping
G sent. G must have either committed to the mappings be-
fore deciding the partition of evaluation and check circuits,
or never learned which circuits are in the check versus the
evaluation sets.
Partial Generation and Partial Evaluation: G creates the
garbled gates necessary for E to enter the previously output
intermediate encrypted values into the next garbled circuit.
These garbled gates are called partial input gates. As shown
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Figure 3: This figure shows how we create a single partial
input gate for each input bit for each circuit and then link
the partial input gates to the remainder of the circuit.
in Figure 3 each garbled circuit is made up of two pieces: the
partial input gates and the remainder of the garbled circuit.
Revealing Incorrect Transformations: Our last goal is to let
E inform G that incorrect values have been detected. With-
out a way to limit leakage, G could gain information based
on whether or not E informs G that she caught him cheat-
ing. This is a selective failure attack and is not present in
our protocol.
4. PARTIALGC PROTOCOL
We start with the CMTB protocol and add cut-and-choose
operations from sS13 before introducing the mechanisms
needed to save and reuse values. We defer to the original
papers for full details of the outsourced oblivious trans-
fer [8] and the generator’s input consistency check [38] sub-
protocols that we use as primitives in our protocol.
Our system operates in the same threat model as CMTB
(see Section 2.1.1): we are secure against a malicious adver-
sary under the assumption of non-collusion. A description of
the CMTB protocol is available in Appendix A.
4.1 Preliminaries
There are three participants in the protocol:
Generator – The generator is the party that generates the
garbled circuit for the 2P-SFE.
Evaluator –The evaluator is the other party in the 2P-
SFE; it outsources computation to the cloud.
Cloud – The cloud is the third party that executes the
garbled circuit outsourced by the evaluator.
Notation
Ci - The ith circuit.
CKeyi - Circuit key used for the free XOR optimization [25].
The key is randomly generated and then used as the differ-
ence between the 0 and 1 wire labels for a circuit Ci.
CSeedi - This value is created by the generator’s PRNG and
is used to generate a particular circuit Ci.
POut#i,j - The partial output values are the encrypted wire
values output from an SFE computation. These are encrypted
garbled circuit values that can be reused in another garbled
circuit computation. # is replaced in our protocol descrip-
tion with either a 0, 1, or x, signifying whether it represents a
0, 1, or an unknown value (from the cloud’s point of view). i
denotes the circuit the POut value came from and j denotes
the wire of the POuti circuit.
PIn#i,j - The partial input values are the re-entered POut
values after they have been obfuscated to remove the circuit
key from the previous computation. These values are input
to the partial input gates. #, i, and j, are the same as above.
GIn#i,j - The garbled circuit input values are the results
of the partial input gates and are input into the remaining
garbled circuit, as shown in Figure 3. #, i, and j, are the
same as above.
Partial Input Gates - These are garbled gates that take in
PIn values and output GIn values. Their purpose is to
transform the PIn values into values that are under CKeyi
for the current circuit.
Algorithm 0: PartialComputation
Input : Circuit File, Bit Security, Number of Circuits, Inputs,
Is First Execution
Output: Circuit File Output
Cut_and_Choose(is First Execution)
Eval Garbled Input ← Evaluator_Input(Eval Select Bits,
Possible Eval Input)
Generator_Input_Check(Gen Input)
Partial Garbled Input ← Partial_Input(Partial Outputtime−1)
Garbled Output, Partial Output ←
Circuit_Execution(Garbled Input (Gen, Eval, Partial))
Circuit_Output(Garbled Output)
Partial_Output(Partial Output)
4.2 Protocol
Each computation is self-contained; other than what is
explicitly described as saved in the protocol, each value or
property is only used for a single part of the computation
(i.e. randomness is different across computations).
Common Inputs: The program circuit file, the bit level secu-
rity K, the circuit level security (number of circuits) S, and
encryption and commitment functions.
Private Inputs: The evaluator’s input evlInput and genera-
tor’s input genInput.
Outputs: The evaluator and generator can both receive gar-
bled circuit outputs.
Phase 1: Preparation and Cut-and-choose
Preparation:
The generator creates two seeds for each circuit C0 . . . CS−1,
CSeedi = {0, 1}K .
We prepare our circuits such that any output to the gen-
erator or evaluator is output under a one-time pad, en-
crypted inside of the circuit. That is we augment all cir-
cuits such that outevl = outevl⊕outputKeyevl and outgen =
outgen ⊕ outKeygen, where outevl and outgen is the initial
output.
The generator and evaluator’s input is extended to include
the corresponding outputKey and a K-bit secret key for a
MAC.
Using the same technique as CMTB for input encoding
to split the evaluator’s input in K bits, where bitj,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕
bitj,K−1 = evlInputj for the jth bit of the evaluator’s in-
put. The generator then creates the possible evaluator’s in-
put for each circuit Ci. To create the evaluator’s input, the
generator creates a key IKeyi = {0, 1}K for the ith cir-
cuit, and a set of seeds, evlInputSeeds0j = {0, 1}K and
evlInputSeeds1j = {0, 1}K , where for 0 <= j < len(evlInput).
Two seeds are created for each bit, representing 0 and 1. The
garbled input values are then created:
garbledInputEvl0ij = hash(evlInputSeeds0j , IKeyi)
garbledInputEvl1ij = hash(evlInputSeeds1j , IKeyi)
As with CMTB, the possible evaluator’s inputs are per-
muted for each different circuit to prevent the cloud from
Algorithm 1: Cut and Choose
Input : is First Execution
if is First Execution then
circuitSelection ← rand() // bit-vector of size S
N ← 25S // Number of evaluation circuits
//Generator creates his garbled input and circuit seeds for each
circuit
for i← 0 to S do
CSeedi ← rand()
garbledGenInputi ← garble(genInput, rand())
//generator creates or loads keys
if is First Execution then
checkKeyi ← rand()
evlKeyi ← rand()
else
loadKeys();
checkKeyi ← hash(loadedCheckKeyi)
evlKeyi ← hash(loadedEvlKeyi)
// encrypts using unique one-time XOR pads
encSeedIni ← CSeedi ⊕ evlKeyi
encGarbledIni ← garbledGenInputi ⊕ checkKeyi
if is First Execution then
// generator offers input OR keys for each circuit seed
selectedKeys←
OT (circuitSelection, {evlKey, checkKey})
else
loadSelectedKeys()
for i← 0 to S do
genSendToEval(hash(checkKeyi),
hash(evaluationKeyi))
for i← 0 to S do
cloudSendToEval(hash(selectedKeyi), isCheckCircuiti)
// If all values match, the evaluator learns split, else abort.
for i← 0 to S do
j ← isCheckCircuiti
correct← (recievedGeni,j == recievedEvli)
if !correct then
abort()
understanding what the evaluator’s input maps to. The gen-
erator commits to each input value so the cloud will be able
to verify he did not swap values.
Cut-and-choose:
Unlike some other GC protocols we do not commit to the
various circuits before we execute the cut-and-choose. We
modify the cut-and-choose mechanism described in sS13 as
we have an extra party involved in the computation. In this
cut-and-choose, the cloud selects which circuits are evalua-
tion circuits and which circuits are check circuits,
circuitSelection = {0, 1}S
where 0 is an evaluation circuit and 1 is a check circuit.
N evaluation circuits and S −N check circuits are selected
(like sS13, we use N = 2
5
S). The generator does not learn
the circuit selection.
The generator generates garbled versions of his input and
circuit seeds for each circuit. He encrypts these values us-
ing unique one-time XOR pad key for each circuit. He also
encrypts the evaluator’s possible input. For 0 ≤ i < S,
garbledGenInputi = garbleInput(genInput)
checkKeyi = {0, 1}K
evlKeyi = {0, 1}K
encGarbledIni = garbledGenInputi ⊕ evlKeyi
encSeedIni = CSeedi ⊕ checkKeyi
encInputEvl = garbledInputEvl ⊕ checkKeyi
where garbleInput() takes in the input, and produces a vec-
tor of {0, 1}K bit strings, one for each bit of the generator’s
input for a given Ci and garbledInputEvl is the garbled in-
put
(garbledInputEvl0i,0|| . . . ||garbledInputEvl0i,len−1
||garbledInputEvl1i,0 || . . . ||garbledInputEvl1i,len−1)
and len is the length of evlInput.
The cloud and generator perform an oblivious transfer
where the generator offers up decryption keys for his input
and decryption keys for the circuit seed and possible eval-
uator’s input for each circuit. The cloud can select the key
to decrypt the generator’s input or the key to decrypt the
circuit seed and possible evaluator’s input for a circuit but
not both.
selectedKeys = OT (circuitSelection, {evlKey, checkKey})
For each circuit, if the cloud selects the decryption key for
the circuit seed and possible evaluator’s input in the obliv-
ious transfer, then the circuit is used as a check circuit. If
the cloud selects the key for the generator’s input then the
circuit is used as an evaluation circuit.
The generator sends the encrypted garbled inputs and
check circuit information for all circuits to the cloud. The
cloud decrypts the information he can decrypt using its keys.
Both the cloud and generator save the decryption keys so
they can be used in future computations, which use saved
values.
The evaluator must also learn the circuit split. The generator
sends a hash of each possible encryption key the cloud could
have selected to the evaluator for each circuit as an ordered
pair. For 0 ≤ i < S,
genSend(hash(checkKeyi), hash(evaluationKeyi))
The cloud sends a hash of the value received to the evaluator
for each circuit. The cloud also sends bits to indicate which
circuits were selected as check or evaluation circuits to the
evaluator. For 0 ≤ i < S,
cloudSend(hash(selectedKeyi), isCheckCircuiti)
The evaluator compares the hash the cloud sent to one of
the hashes the generator sent, which is selected by the circuit
selection sent by the cloud. For 0 ≤ i < S,
j = isCheckCircuiti
correct = (receivedGeni,j == receivedEvli)
If all values match, the evaluator uses the isCheckCircuiti
to learn the split between check and evaluator circuits. Oth-
erwise, abort.
We only perform the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer for
the initial computation. For any subsequent computations,
the generator and evaluator hash the saved decryption keys
and use those hashes as the new encryption and decryption
keys. The circuit split selected by the cloud is saved and
stays the same across computations.
At the conclusion of this step (1) the cloud has all the
information to evaluate the evaluation circuits when they
are sent by the generator, i.e. the generator’s input for each
evaluation circuit, (2) the cloud has all the information to
validate the check circuits when the generator sends those
over, i.e., each circuit seed and the possible evaluator’s input
for the check circuits (3) the cloud and evaluator know the
check and evaluation circuit split, (4) the generator does not
know the circuit split.
Phase 2: Evaluator’s Input and Oblivious Transfer
Algorithm 2: Evaluator Input
Input : Eval Select Bits, Possible Eval Input
Output: Eval Garbled Input
// cloud gets selected input wires // generator offers both
possible input wire values for each input wire; evaluator selects
its input
outSeeds = BaseOOT (bitsEvl, possibleInputs).
// the generator sends unique IKey values for each circuit to the
evaluator
for i← 0 to S do
genSendToEval(IKeyi)
// the evaluator sends IKey values for all evaluation circuits to
the cloud
for i← 0 to S do
if !isCheckCircuit(i) then
EvalSendToCloud(IKeyi)
// cloud uses this to learn appropriate inputs
for i← 0 to S do
for j ← 0 to len(evlInputs) do
if !isCheckCircuit(i) then
inputEvlij ← hash(IKeysi, outSeedsj)
return inputEvl
We use the base outsourced oblivious transfer (OOT) of
CMTB. In CMTB’s OOT, the evaluator enters in the inputs
buts and the generator enters in both possible inputs. The
evaluator and generator perform a single OT operation be-
fore extending it, using the Ishai OT extension, to all the
input bits.
After extending it across each input bit, it is then ex-
tended across each garbled circuit using the same technique
described in the algorithm. After the OOT is finished, the
cloud has the selected input wire values, which represent the
evaluator’s input.
As with CMTB, which uses the results from a single OOT
as seeds to create the evaluator’s input for all circuits, the
cloud in our system also uses seeds from a single base OT
(called“BaseOOT”below) to generate the input for the eval-
uation circuits. The cloud receives the seeds for each input
bit selected by the evaluator.
outSeeds = BaseOOT (evlInput, evlInputSeeds).
where outSeeds are the seeds selected by the evaluator’s
input.
The generator sends the IKeyi keys (from phase 1) to
the evaluator for each circuit. The evaluator sends the keys
for the evaluation circuits to the cloud. The cloud then uses
these keys and the outSeeds to attain the evaluator’s in-
put. For 0 ≤ i < S, for 0 ≤ j < len(evlInputs) where
!isCheckCircuit(i),
inputEvlij = hash(IKeyi, outSeedsj)
Phase 3: Generator’s Input Consistency Check
We use the input consistency check of sS13. In this check,
a universal hash is used to prove consistency of the genera-
tor’s input across each evaluation circuit (attained in phase
1). Simply put, if any hash is different in any of the evalua-
tion circuits, we know the generator did not enter consistent
input. More formally, a hash of the generator’s input is taken
for each circuit. For 0 < i < S where !isCheckCircuit(i),
ti = UHF (garbledGenInputi, Ci)
Algorithm 3: Generator Input Check
Input : Generator Input
// The cloud takes a hash of the generator’s input or each
evaluation circuit for i← 0 to S do
if isCheckCircuit(i) then
ti ← UHF (garbledGenInputi)
//If a single hash is different then the cloud knows the generator
tried to cheat.
correct← ((t0 == t1)&(t0 == t2)& . . .&(t0 == tN−1))
if !correct then
abort()
The results of these universal hashes are compared. If a sin-
gle hash is different then the cloud knows the generator tried
to cheat.
correct = ((t0 == t1)&(t0 == t2)& . . .&(t0 == tN−1))
Phase 4: Partial Input Gate Generation, Check, and
Evaluation
Generation:
For 0 ≤ i < S, for 0 ≤ j < len(savedWires) the gener-
ator creates a partial input gate, which transforms a wire’s
saved values, POut0i,j and POut1i,j , into values that can
be used in the current garbled circuit execution, GIn0i,j and
GIn1i,j .
For each circuit 0 ≤ i < S, the generator creates a pseu-
dorandom transformation value Ri = {0, 1}K , to assist with
the transformation.
For each set of POut0i,j and POut1i,j , the generator
XORs each value with Ri. Both results are then hashed, and
put through a function to determine the new permutation
bit, as hashing removes the old permutation bit.
t0 = hash(POut0i,j ⊕Ri)
t1 = hash(POut1i,j ⊕Ri)
PIn0i,j , P In1i,j = setPPBitGen(t0, t1)
This function, setPPBitGen, pseudo-randomly finds a bit
that is different between the two values of the wire and notes
that bit to be the permutation bit. setPPBitGen is seeded
from CSeedi, allowing the cloud to regenerate these values
for the check circuits.
For each PIn0i,j , P In1i,j pair, a set of values, GIn0i,j
and GIn1i,j , are created under the master key of Ci – where
CKeyi is the difference between 0 and 1 wire labels for the
circuit. In classic garbled gate style, two truth table values,
TT0i,j and TT1i,j , are created such that:
TT0i,j ⊕ PIn0i,j = GIn0i,j
TT1i,j ⊕ PIn1i,j = GIn1i,j
The truth table, TT0i,j and TT1i,j , is permuted so that
the permutation bits of PIn0i,j and PIn1i,j tell the cloud
which entry to select. Each partial input gate, consisting of
the permuted TT0i,j , TT1i,j values, the bit location from
setPPBitGen, and each Ri, is sent to the cloud.
Check:
For all the check circuits, (i.e., ∀i : 0 ≤ i < S where
isCheckCircuit(i) is true), for 0 ≤ j < len(savedWires),
the cloud receives the truth table information, TT0i,j , TT1i,j ,
and bit location from setPPBitGen, and proceeds to re-
generate the gates based on the check circuit information.
The cloud uses Ri (sent by the generator), POut0i,j and
Algorithm 4: Partial Input
Input : Partial Output
Output: Partial Garbled Input
// Generation: the generator creates a partial input gate, which
transforms a wire’s saved values, POut0i,j and POut1i,j , into
values that can be used in the current garbled circuit execution,
GIn0i,j and GIn1i,j .
for i← 0 to S do
Ri ← PRNG.random()
for j ← 0 to len(savedWires) do
t0← hash(POut0i,j ⊕ Ri)
t1← hash(POut1i,j ⊕ Ri)
PIn0i,j , PIn1i,j ← setPPBitGen(t0, t1)
GIn0i,j ← TT0i,j ⊕ PIn0i,j
GIn1i,j ← TT1i,j ⊕ PIn1i,j
GenSendToCloud( Permute([TT0i,j , TT1i,j ]),
permute bit locations )
GenSendToCloud(Ri)
// Check: The cloud checks the gates to make sure the generator
didn’t cheat
for i← 0 to S do
if isCheckCircuit(i) then
for j ← 0 to len(savedWires) do
// the cloud has received the truth table
information, TT0i,j , TT1i,j , bit locations from
setPPBitGen, and Ri
correct← (generateGateFromInfo() ==
receivedGateFromGen())
// If any gate does not match, the cloud knows the
generator tried to cheat.
if !correct then
abort();
// Evaluation
for i← 0 to S do
if !isCheckCircuit(i) then
for j ← 0 to len(savedWires) do
//The cloud, using the previously saved POutxi,j
value, and the location (point and permute) bit sent
by the generator, creates PInxi,j
PInxi,j ←
setPPBitEval(hash(Ri ⊕ POutxi,j), location)
// Using PInxi,j , the cloud selects the proper
truth table entry TTxi,j from either TT0i,j or
TT1i,j to decrypt
// Creates GInxi,j to enter into the garbled circuit
GInxi,j ← TTxi,j ⊕ POutxi,j
return GIn;
POut1i,j (saved during the previous execution), and CSeedi
(recovered during the cut-and-choose) to generate the par-
tial input gates in the same manner as described previously.
The cloud then compares these gates to those the genera-
tor sent. If any gate does not match, the cloud knows the
generator tried to cheat.
Evaluation:
For 0 ≤ i < S where !isCheckCircuit(i), for 0 ≤ j <
len(savedWires) the cloud receives the truth table informa-
tion, TTai,j , TTbi,j and bit location from setPPBitGen. a
and b are used to denote the two permuted truth table val-
ues. The cloud, using the previously saved POutxi,j value,
creates the PInxi,j value
PInxi,j = setPPBitEval(hash(Ri ⊕ POutxi,j), location)
where location is the location of the point and permute
bit sent by the generator. Using the point and permute
bit of PInxi,j , the cloud selects the proper truth table en-
try TTxi,j from either TTai,j or TTbi,j to decrypt, creates
GInxi,j and then enters GInxi,j into the garbled circuit.
GInxi,j = TTxi,j ⊕ POutxi,j
Phase 5: Circuit Generation and Evaluation
Algorithm 5: Circuit Execution
Input : Generator Input, Evaluator Input, Partial Input
Output: Partial Output, Garbled Output
// The generator generates each garbled gate and sends it to the
cloud. Depending on whether the circuit is a check or evaluation
circuit, the cloud verifies that the gate is correct or evaluates the
gate.
for i← 0 to S do
for j ← 0 to len(circuit) do
g ← genGate(Ci, j)
send(g)
// the cloud receives all gates for all circuits, and then checks
OR evaluates each circuit
for i← 0 to S do
for j ← 0 to len(circuit) do
g ← recvGate()
if isCheckCircuit(i) then
if ! verifyCorrect(g) then
abort()
else
eval(g)
return Partial Output, Garbled Output
Circuit Generation:
The generator generates every garbled gate for each circuit
and sends them to the cloud. Since the generator does not
know the check and evaluation circuit split, nothing changes
between the generation for check and evaluation circuits. For
0 ≤ i < S, For 0 ≤ j < len(circuit),
g = garbleGate(Ci, j)
send(g)
Circuit Evaluation and Check:
The cloud receives garbled gates for all circuits. For eval-
uation circuits the cloud evaluates those garbled gates. For
check circuits the cloud generates the correct gate, based
on the circuit seed, and is able to verify it is correct. For
0 ≤ i < S, For 0 ≤ j < len(circuit),
g = recvGate()
if(isCheckCircuit(i)) verifyCorrect(g)
else eval(g)
If a garbled gate is found not to be correct, the cloud
informs the evaluator and generator of the incorrect gate
and safely aborts.
Phase 6: Output and Output Consistency Check
Algorithm 6: Circuit Output
Input : Garbled Output
// a MAC of the output is generated inside the garbled circuit,
and both the resulting garbled circuit output and the MAC are
encrypted under a one-time pad.
outEvlComplete = outEvl||MAC(outEvl)
result = (outEvlMAC == MAC(outEvl))
if !result then
abort() // output check fail
As the final step of the garbled circuit execution, a MAC
of the output is generated inside the garbled circuit, based
on a k-bit secret key entered into the function.
outEvlComplete = outEvl||MAC(outEvl)
Both the resulting garbled circuit output and the MAC are
encrypted under the one-time pad (from phase 1 before)
leaving the garbled circuit.
To receive output from the garbled circuit for any particu-
lar output bit x, a majority vote is taken across all evaluation
circuits. For 0 ≤ i < S where !isCheckCircuit(i),
result = majority(COut0,x . . . COuti−1,x)
Where COuti,j is the output bits, i is the ith circuit and
j is the jth output bit from circuit i.
The cloud sends the corresponding encrypted (under the
one-time pad introduced in phase 1) output to each party.
The generator and evaluator then decrypt the received
ciphertext by using their one-time pad keys and perform
a MAC over real output to verify the cloud did not modify
the output by comparing the generated MAC with the MAC
calculated within the garbled circuit.
result = (outEvlMAC == MAC(outEvl))
Both parties, the generator and evaluator, now have their
output.
Phase 7: Partial Output
Algorithm 7: Partial Output
Input : Partial Output
for i← 0 to S do
for j ← 0 to len(Partial Output) do
//The generator saves both possible wire values
GenSave(Partial Output0i,j)
GenSave(Partial Output1i,j)
for i← 0 to S do
for j ← 0 to len(Partial Output) do
if isCheckCircuit(i) then
EvlSave(Partial Output0i,j)
EvlSave(Partial Output1i,j)
else
// circuit is evaluation circuit
EvlSave(Partial OutputXi,j)
The generator saves both possible wire values for each
partial output wire. For each evaluation circuit the cloud
saves the partial output wire value. For check circuits the
cloud saves both possible output values.
4.3 Implementation
As with most garbled circuit systems there are two stages
to our implementation. The first stage is a compiler for cre-
ating garbled circuits, while the second stage is an execution
system to evaluate the circuits.
We modified the compiler from Kreuter et al. [27] (hereon
KSS12 compiler) to allow for the saving of intermediate wire
labels and loading wire labels from a different SFE compu-
tation. By using the KSS12 compiler, we have an added ben-
efit of being able to compare circuits of almost identical size
and functionality between our system and CMTB, whereas
other protocols compare circuits of sometimes vastly differ-
ent sizes.
For our execution system, we started with the CMTB sys-
tem and modified it according to our protocol requirements.
PartialGC automatically performs the output consistency
check, and we implemented this check at the circuit level.
We became aware and corrected issues with CMTB relat-
ing to too many primitive OT operations (S ∗ inputs instead
inputs) performed in the outsourced oblivious transfer when
using a high circuit parameter and too low a general security
parameter (log2(input) instead of 80). The fixes reduced the
run-time of the OOT, though the exact amount varied.
5. SECURITY OF PARTIALGC
In this section, we provide a proof of the PartialGC pro-
tocol, showing that our protocol preserves the standard se-
curity guarantees provided by traditional garbled circuits -
that is, none of the parties learns anything about the pri-
vate inputs of the other parties that is not logically implied
by the output it receives. Section 5.1 provides a high-level
overview of the proof. Section 5.2 goes over models and def-
initions, followed by security guarantees in Section 5.3 and
a full proof in Section 5.4.
5.1 Proof Sketch
We know that the protocol described in CMTB allows
us to garble individual circuits and securely outsource their
evaluation. In this paper, we modify certain portions of the
protocol to allow us to transform the output wire values
from a previous circuit execution into input wire values in a
new circuit execution. These transformed values, which can
be checked by the evaluator, are created by the generator
using circuit “seeds.”
We also use some aspects of sS13, notably their novel cut-
and-choose technique which ensures that the generator does
not learn which circuits are used for evaluation and which
are used for checking - this means that the generator must
create the correct transformation values for all of the cut-
and-choose circuits.
Because we assume that the CMTB garbled circuit scheme
can securely garble any circuit, we can use it individually on
the circuit used in the first execution and on the circuits used
in subsequent executions. We focus on the changes made at
the end of the first execution and the beginning of subse-
quent executions which are introduced by PartialGC.
The only difference between the initial garbled circuit ex-
ecution and any other garbled circuit in CMTB is that the
output wires in an initial PartialGC circuit are stored by the
cloud, and are not delivered to the generator or the evalua-
tor. This prevents them from learning the output wire labels
of the initial circuit, but cannot be less secure than CMTB,
since no additional steps are taken here.
Subsequent circuits we wish to garble differ from ordinary
CMTB garbled circuits only by the addition, before the first
row of gates, of a set of partial input gates. These gates don’t
change the output along a wire, but differ from normal gar-
bled gates in that the two possible labels for each input wire
are not chosen randomly by the generator, but are derived
by using the two labels along each output wire of the initial
garbled circuit.
This does not reduce security. In PartialGC, the input
labels for partial input gates have the same property as the
labels for ordinary garbled input gates: the generator knows
both labels, but does not know which one corresponds to the
evaluator’s input, and the evaluator knows only the label
corresponding to its input, but not the other label. This is
because the evaluator’s input is exactly the output of the
initial garbled circuit, the output labels of which were saved
by the evaluator. The evaluator does not learn the other
output label for any of the output gates because the output
of each garbled gate is encrypted. If the evaluator could learn
any output labels other than those which result from an
evaluation of the garbled circuit, the original garbled circuit
scheme itself would not be secure.
The generator, which also generated the initial garbled
circuit, knows both possible input labels for all partial eval-
uation gates, because it has saved both potential output
labels of the initial circuit’s output gates. Because of the
outsourced oblivious transfer used in CMTB, the generator
did not know which input labels to use for the initial garbled
circuit, and therefore will not have been able to determine
the output labels for that circuit. Therefore, the generator
will likewise not know which input labels are being used for
subsequent garbled circuits.
5.2 Model and definitions
Throughout our protocol, we assume that none of the par-
ties involved ever collude with the cloud. It is known that
theoretical limitations exist when considering collusion in
secure multiparty computation, and other schemes consid-
ering secure computation with multiple parties require sim-
ilar restrictions on who and how many parties may collude
while preserving security. If an outsourcing protocol is se-
cure when both the generator and the cloud are malicious
and colluding, this implies a secure two-party scheme where
one party has sub-linear work with respect to the size of the
circuit, which is currently only possible with fully homo-
morphic encryption [22]. However, making the assumption
that the cloud will not collude with the participating parties
makes outsourcing securely a theoretical possibility.
While it is unlikely that a reputable cloud provider would
allow external parties to illegally control or modify computa-
tions within their systems, we cannot assume the cloud will
automatically be semi-honest. For example, our protocol re-
quires a number of consistency checks to be performed by
the cloud that ensure the participants do not cheat. Without
mechanisms to force the cloud to make these checks, a “lazy”
cloud provider could save resources by simply returning that
all checks verified without actually performing them.
The work of Kamara et al. [22] formalizes the idea of a
non-colluding cloud based on the ideal-model/real-model se-
curity definitions common in secure multiparty computa-
tion. We apply their definitions to our protocol (for the two-
party case in particular) as described below.
Real-model execution. The protocol takes place between
two parties (P1, P2) executing the protocol and a server P3,
where each of the executing parties provides input xi, aux-
iliary input zi, and random coins ri. The server provides
only auxiliary input z3 and random coins r3. There exists
some subset of independent parties (A1, ..Am),m ≤ 3 that
are malicious adversaries. Each adversary corrupts one ex-
ecuting party and does not share information with other
adversaries. For all honest parties, let OUTi be its output,
and for corrupted parties let OUTi be its view of the pro-
tocol execution. The ith partial output of a real execution
is defined as REAL(i)(k, x; r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H} ∪ OUTi,
where H is the set of honest parties and r is all random coins
of all players.
Ideal-model execution. In the ideal model, the setup of
participants is the same except that all parties are inter-
acting with a trusted party that evaluates the function. All
parties provide inputs xi, auxiliary input zi, and random
coins ri. If a party is semi-honest, it provides its actual in-
puts to the trusted party, while if the party is malicious
or non-colluding, it provides arbitrary input values. In the
case of the server P3, this means simply providing its aux-
iliary input and random coins, as no input is provided to
the function being evaluated. Once the function is evalu-
ated by the trusted third party, it returns the result to
the parties P1 and P2, while the server P3 does not re-
ceive the output. If a party aborts early or sends no in-
put, the trusted party immediately aborts. For all honest
parties, let OUTi be its output to the trusted party, and
for corrupted parties let OUTi be some value output by Pi.
The ith partial output of an ideal execution in the pres-
ence of some set of independent simulators is defined as
IDEAL(i)(k, x; r) = {OUTj : j ∈ H} ∪ OUTi where H is
the set of honest parties and r is all random coins of all
players.
Definition 1. A protocol securely computes a function f
if there exists a set of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
simulators {Simi}i∈[3] such that for all PPT adversaries
(A1, . . . , A3), x, z, and for all i ∈ [3], we have
{REAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N ≈ {IDEAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N
Where S = (S1, . . . , S3), Si = Simi(Ai), and r is random
and uniform.
5.3 Security Guarantees
Generator’s Input Consistency Check
During the cut-and-choose, multiple copies of the garbled
circuit are constructed and then either checked or evaluated.
A malicious generator may provide inconsistent inputs to
different evaluation circuits. For some functions, it is possible
to use inconsistent inputs to extract information of Eval’s
input [29].
Claim 1. The generator in our protocol cannot trick the
evaluator into using different inputs for different evaluation
circuits with greater than negligible probability.
We use the generator’s input consistency check from [38],
and defer to the proof provided in that paper, noting that
simulators S1 and S2 can be constructed such that any ma-
licious generator (resp. evaluator) cannot tell whether it is
working with S1 (resp. S2) in the ideal model, or with an
honest evaluator (resp. generator) in the real model.
We further note there is no problem with allowing the
cloud to perform this check; for the generator’s inconsistent
input to pass the check, the cloud would have to see the
malicious input and ignore it, which would violate the non-
collusion assumption.
Validity of Evaluator Inputs
To ensure that the generator cannot learn anything about
the evaluator’s inputs by corrupting the garbled values sent
during the OT, we use from CMTB the random input en-
coding technique by Lindell and Pinkas [29]. This technique
allows the evaluator to encode each input bit as the XOR of a
set of input bits. Thus, if the generator corrupts one of those
input bits as in a selective failure attack, it reveals nothing
about the evaluator’s true input. Additionally, we use the
commitment technique employed by Kreuter et al. [27] to
ensure that the generator cannot swap garbled input wire
labels between the zero and one value. To accomplish this,
the generator commits to the wire labels before the cut and
choose. During the cut and choose, the input labels for the
check circuits are opened to ensure that they correspond to
only one value across all circuits. Then, during the OOT,
the commitment keys for the labels that will be evaluated
are sent instead of the wire labels themselves. Because our
protocol implements this technique directly from previous
work, we do not make any additional claims of security.
Correctness of Saved Values
Scenarios where either party enters incorrect values in the
next computation reduce to previously solved problems in
garbled circuits. If the generator does not use the correct
values, then it reduces to the problem of creating an incor-
rect garbled circuit. If the evaluator does not use the correct
saved values then it reduces to the problem of the evaluator
entering garbage values into the garbled circuit execution;
this would be caught by the output consistency check.
Garbled Circuit Generation
To ensure the evaluated circuits are generated honestly, we
require two properties. First, we limit the generator’s ability
to trick the evaluator into evaluating a corrupted circuit
using a cut-and-choose technique similar to a typical, two-
party garbled circuit evaluation. Second, we ensure that a
lazy Cloud attempting to conserve system resources cannot
bypass the circuit checking step without being discovered.
Claim 2. Security: Assuming that the hash function UHF (x)
(as used in phase 3) is a one-way, collision-resistant hash
and that the commitment scheme used is fully binding, then
the generator has at best a 2−k probability of tricking the
evaluator into evaluating a majority of corrupted circuits,
where k is the number of circuits generated.
This claim follows directly from sS13. The probability of
the generator finding a hash collision and thus fooling the
evaluator is at most 1/ |B|, where B is the range of the hash
function.
Claim 3. Proof-of-work: Assuming the hash function is one-
way and collision resistant, the Cloud has a negligible prob-
ability of producing a check hash that passes the seed check
without actually generating the check circuit.
As previously stated, before the circuit check begins the
generator sends the evaluator k hashed circuit valuesH1(GCi).
Once the evaluation circuits are selected, the cloud must
generate some circuits and hash them into check hashes
H1(GC
′
i). If the cloud attempts to skip the generation of
the check circuits, it must generate hash values H ′i = Hi for
i ∈ Chk. Based on security guarantees of the hash, and the
non-collusion property, the cloud has a negligible probability
of correctly generating these hash values.
Abort on Check Failure
If any of the check circuits fail, the cloud reports the in-
correct check circuit to both the generator and evaluator. At
this point, the remaining computation and any saved values
must be abandoned. However, as is standard in SFE, the
cloud cannot abort on an incorrect evaluation circuit even
when it is known to be incorrect.
Concatenation of Incorrect Circuits
If the generator produces a single incorrect circuit and the
cloud does not abort, the generator learns that the circuit
was used for evaluation, and not as a check circuit. This leaks
no information about the input or output of the computa-
tion; to do that, the generator must corrupt a majority of
the evaluation circuits without modifying a check circuit. An
incorrect circuit that goes undetected in one execution has
no effect on subsequent executions as long the total amount
of incorrect circuits is less than the majority of evaluation
circuits.
Using Multiple Evaluators
One of the benefits of our outsourcing scheme is that the
state is saved at the generator and cloud allowing the use of
different evaluators in each computation. Previously, it was
shown a group of users working with a single server using
2P-SFE was not secure against malicious adversaries, as a
malicious server and last k parties, also malicious, could re-
play their portion of the computation with different inputs
and gain more information than they can with a single com-
putation [15]. However, this is not a problem in our system
as at least one of our servers, either the generator or cloud,
must be semi-honest due to non-collusion, which obviates
the attack stated above.
Threat Model
As we have many computations involving the same gen-
erator and cloud, we have to extend the threat model for
how the parties can act in different computations. There can
be no collusion in each singular computation. However, the
malicious party can change between computations as long as
there is no chain of malicious users that link the generator
and cloud – this would break the non-collusion assumption.
5.4 Proof
We formally prove the security of our protocol with the
following theorem, which gives security guarantees identical
to that of CMTB and the protocol by Kamara et al. [22].
Theorem 1. The outsourced two-party SFE protocol se-
curely computes a function f(a, b) in the following two cor-
ruption scenarios: (1)The Cloud is malicious and non-cooperative
with respect to the rest of the parties, while all other parties
are semi-honest, and (2)All but one party is malicious, while
the Cloud is semi-honest.
Proof. To demonstrate that {REAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N ≈
{IDEAL(i)(k, x; r)}k∈N , ∀i ∈ {generator, evaluator, cloud},
we consider separately each case where a party deviates from
the protocol, and then show that these cases reveal no ad-
ditional information, by considering each point at which the
parties interact.
For the remaining portion of the proof, we shall call the
generator, the evaluator, and the cloud, as A, B, and C,
respectively. To denote that a party is malicious, we shall
use A*, B*, and C*, respectively.
5.4.1 Malicious Evaluator
Both the generator and the cloud participate honestly in
the protocol. During the protocol execution, the evaluator
only exchanges messages with the other participants at cer-
tain points: the cut-and-choose, the oblivious transfer, send-
ing decryption information at the end of the OOT, checking
the generator’s input consistency, and receiving the proof of
validity and output from the garbled circuit. Thus, our sim-
ulator need only ensure that these sections of the protocol
are indistinguishable to the adversary - e.g., we need not
consider phase 4. Our proof comprises the following hybrid
experiments and lemmas:
Simulating the random number generation / coin-
flip
Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
REAL(A)(k, x; r) except that instead of running a fair coin
toss protocol with A*, the experiment chooses a random
string ρ, and a coin-flipping simulator ScoinFlip(ρ, 1
k) pro-
duces the protocol messages that output ρ.
Lemma 1. REAL(A)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of the fair coin toss protocol,
we know that there exists a simulator ScoinFlip(·, ·) such
that an interaction with ScoinFlip(·, ·) is indistinguishable
from a real protocol interaction. Since everything else in
Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r) is exactly the same as inREAL(A)(k, x; r),
this proves the lemma.
Simulating the primitive OT
Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r) except that during the Outsourced Obliv-
ious Transfer, the experiment invokes a simulator SOT to
simulate the primitive oblivious transfer operation with A*.
The simulator sends A* a random string s and receives the
columns of the matrix Q*.
Lemma 2. Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the malicious security of the OT primitive,
we know that there exists a simulator SOT such that an in-
teraction with this simulator is indistinguishable from a real
execution of the oblivious transfer protocol. Since everything
else in Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r) is identical to Hybrid1(A)(k, x; r),
this proves the lemma.
Checking the output of OOT
Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r) except that the experiment aborts if the
matrix Q* is not formed correctly (that is, if A* used incon-
sistent input values ea∗ for any column in generating Q*).
Lemma 3. Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Let us consider a case in Hybrid2(A)(k, x; r) where
for some value of i, A* sends the column value T i ⊕ ea′ for
some ea′ 6= ea∗ such that the ith bit is b in ea∗ and b⊕ 1 in
ea′. Then, for every row in Q*, the ith bit will be encrypted
in the b⊕ 1 entry.
However, when A* sends the value ea∗ ⊕ p∗ to the cloud
for decryption, the cloud will decrypt the ith choice, and
then it will decrypt the b ⊕ 1 entry instead of the b entry.
This will result in an invalid decryption with probability
1−  for a negligible value of . This decryption is not (with
high probability) a valid commitment key, so the garbled in-
put values won’t de-commit, causing the cloud to abort. In
Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r), since the experiment observes the mes-
sages Q* , p* , and ea∗⊕p∗ , it can recover ea∗ and check Q*
for consistency. (The cloud always aborts if an inconsistency
is detected.)
Simulating consistency check and substituting in-
puts
Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r) except that the experiment provides a
string of 2 · n zeros, denoted 02·n, during the consistency
check to replace the generator’s input.
Lemma 4. Hybrid3(A)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Here we cite the proof of shelat and Shen’s scheme [38].
Since the messages sent in our scheme are identical to theirs
in content, we simply change the entity sending the message
in the experiment and the lemma still holds.
Output and output consistency check
Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r): This experiment is identical to
Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r) except that instead of returning the out-
put of the circuit, the experiment provides A* with the result
sent from the trusted external oracle.
Lemma 5. Hybrid4(A)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid5(A)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of garbled circuits, the trusted
third party output and the circuit output will be indistin-
guishable when provided with the input of A*, ea∗. Since
we have the k-bit secret key and know the output, we can
produce the necessary MAC under the one time pad (similar
to Hybrid1). Simulating a majority vote is trivial; the eval-
uator then decrypts the ciphertext using its OTP key, and
then performs a MAC on the output, and compares with
the MAC produced within the garbled circuit. This, again,
is indistinguishable from the circuit version since we know
the output and can ensure that the MACs are identical.
5.4.2 Malicious Generator
Here, both the evaluator and the cloud participate hon-
estly in the protocol.
Simulating the cut and choose Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r): This
experiment is the same as REAL(B)(k, x; r), except during
the oblivious transfer (the generator offers up decryption
keys for his input as well as for the circuit seed and possi-
ble evaluator’s input for each circuit), where we randomly
choose check and evaluation circuits.
Lemma 6. REAL(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. Since the generator does not learn the circuit split
because of the security of the oblivious transfer, this portion
of the protocol is indistinguishable from the real version. We
can perform all the checks and decryptions required; we also
have all the keys needed to check whether we should abort,
so a selective failure attack does not help distinguish between
the experiment and the real version.
Simulating the OT Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r): This experiment
is the same as Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r) except that rather than
run the primitive oblivious transfer with A, the experiment
generates a random input string ea′ and a random matrix T,
then runs a simulator SOT with B*, which gives B* exactly
one element from the pair (T i, T i ⊕ ea′) depending on the
ith selection bit of B*.
Lemma 7. Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of the primitive OT scheme, we
know that the simulator SOT exists, that it can recover B*’s
selection bits from the interaction, and that an interaction
with it is indistinguishable from a real execution of the OT.
Since B* cannot learn any distinguishing information from
A’s input, again based on the security of the OT primitive,
indistinguishability holds between the two experiments.
Checking the output of OOT Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r): This
experiment is the same as Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r) except that
the experiment checks the validity of B*’s output from the
OOT. Since the experiment possesses T , ea′, and s∗ (which
was recovered by the oblivious transfer simulator SOT in the
previous hybrid), the experiment can check whether or not
the encrypted set of outputs Y* is well-formed. If not, the
experiment aborts.
Lemma 8. Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. Recall that in Hybrid2(B)(k, x; r), if B* does not for-
mat the output of the OOT correctly, the cloud will fail to
recover a valid commitment key with probability 1−, where
 is negligible in the security parameter. In this case, the
committed garbled circuit labels will fail to decrypt properly
and the cloud will abort the protocol. In Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r),
since the experiment has seen the values Q, s∗, ea′, and Y*,
it can trivially check to see whether Y* is correctly formed;
we about on failure, so a selective failure attack does not
help distinguish between the experiment and the real ver-
sion. Further, B* cannot swap any of A’s input labels in the
commitments [38].
Checking input consistency and recovering inputs
Hybrid4(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r) except that the experiment recovers B*’s
input b* during the input consistency check using the ran-
dom seed recovered in Hybrid1(B)(k, x; r). If the consistency
check does not pass or if B*’s input cannot be recovered, the
experiment immediately aborts.
Lemma 9. Hybrid3(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid4(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. The experiment can perform a hash of the genera-
tor’s input for each evaluation circuit (we know the split
from Hybrid1). If any of these hashes are different, then we
know that the generator tried to cheat [38] and can abort if
necessary - this is done by the cloud in the real version of
the protocol.
Generating, checking, and evaluating partial input
gates
Hybrid5(B)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid4(B)(k, x; r), except for the following: for check cir-
cuits, the experiment uses the data sent by the generator,
as well as POut0i,j , POut1i,j , and CSeedi (recovered dur-
ing the cut-and-choose) to generate the partial input gates
in the same manner as shown in phase 4. It then compares
these gates to those the generator sent. If any gate does not
match, we know the generator tried to cheat. For evaluation
circuits, it finds the point and permute bit and produces the
value GInxi,j (this is needed for future hybrids).
Lemma 10. Hybrid4(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid5(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. The experiment already has all the POut values from
previous hybrids, and receives
Ri, TT0i,j , TT1i,j , and bit location (setPPBitGen) from
B*. It also has CSeedi from Hybrid1 - thus, it can generate
the partial input gates as described in phase 4, and perform
all the necessary checks. Since we also know the split from
Hybrid1, we can also generate GInxi,j values for the evalua-
tion circuits (which are then entered into the garbled circuit
by the cloud in the real version of the protocol).
Simulating the output check Hybrid6(B)(k, x; r): This
experiment is the same as Hybrid5(B)(k, x; r) except that
during the output phase the experiment prepares the result
received from the trusted third party as the output instead
of the output from the circuit.
Lemma 11. Hybrid5(B)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid6(B)(k, x; r)
Proof. Based on the security of garbled circuits, the trusted
third party output and the circuit output will be indistin-
guishable when provided with the input of B*, b∗. Since we
have the k-bit secret key and know the output, we can pro-
duce the necessary MAC under the one time pad (similar to
Hybrid1). Simulating a majority vote is trivial; the experi-
ment then decrypts the ciphertext using its OTP key, and
then performs a MAC on the output, and compares with
the MAC produced within the garbled circuit. This, again,
is indistinguishable from the circuit version to B*, since we
know the appropriate OTP key.
5.4.3 Malicious Cloud
Here, both the generator and the evaluator participate
honestly in the protocol.
Replacing inputs for the OOT Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r): This
experiment is the same as REAL(C)(k, x; r) except that dur-
ing the OOT, the experiment replaces A’s input ea with a
string of zeros ea′ = 02·l·n. This value is then used to select
garbled input values from B in the OOT, which are then
forwarded to C* according to the protocol.
Lemma 12. REAL(C)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In a real execution, C* will observe the random ma-
trix T, the encrypted commitment keys Y, and A’s input
XOR’d with the permutation string ea ⊕ p. Since p is ran-
dom, ea⊕p is indistinguishable from p. Since T is randomly
generated in both REAL(C)(k, x; r) and Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r),
they are trivially indistinguishable. Considering the output
pairs Y, half of the commitment keys (those not selected by
A) will consist of values computationally indistinguishable
from random (since they are XOR’d with a hash), and the
keys can only be recovered if C* can find a collision with the
hash value H(j, s) without having B’s random value s. Thus,
C* cannot distinguish an execution of OOT with A’s input
ea and the simulator’s input replacement ea′. Since the rest
of the protocol follows REAL(C)(k, x; r) exactly, this proves
the lemma.
Replacing inputs for the consistency check
Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r) except that the experiment replaces B’s
input b with all zeros 02·n. This value is then prepared and
checked according to the protocol for consistency across eval-
uation circuits.
Lemma 13. Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In this hybrid, C* observes a set of garbled input wire
values from B. Based on the security of garbled circuits, ob-
serving one set of garbled input wire values is indistinguish-
able from observing any other set of input wire values, such
that C* cannot distinguish between the garbled input for b
and the garbled input for 02·n. The rest of the hybrid is the
same as Hybrid1(C)(k, x; r).
Partial gates Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is the
same asHybrid2(C)(k, x; r) except that the experiment sends
the appropriate truth table information, Ri, POut values,
and the bit location from setPPBitGen to C*.
Lemma 14. Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. In this hybrid, C* observes a set of garbled wire and
truth table values from B. Since these partial gates are iden-
tical to garbled circuit gates as far as operation is concerned,
the security of garbled circuits ensures that observing one
set of garbled input wire values is indistinguishable from
observing any other set of wire values, such that C* cannot
distinguish between the garbled value for b and the gar-
bled value for 02·n. The rest of the hybrid is the same as
Hybrid2(C)(k, x; r).
Checking the output
Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r): This experiment is the same as
Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r) except that after the circuit is evaluated,
the experiment checks that the result output by C* is as
expected; otherwise, the experiment immediately aborts.
Lemma 15. Hybrid3(C)(k, x; r) ≈ Hybrid4(C)(k, x; r)
Proof. After the cloud sends the output (under the OTP
from phase 1) to us, we can decrypt, since we have the OTP
from previous hybrids. We then perform a MAC and com-
pare with the MAC calculated within the garbled circuit to
verify that C* did not modify the output.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now demonstrate the efficacy of PartialGC through
a comparison with the CMTB outsourcing system. Apart
from the performance gains from using cut-and-choose from
sS13, PartialGC provides other benefits through generating
partial input values after the first execution of a program.
On subsequent executions, the partial inputs act to amortize
overall costs of execution and bandwidth.
We demonstrate that the evaluator in the system can be a
mobile device outsourcing computation to a more powerful
system. We also show that other devices, such as server-
class machines, can act as evaluators, to show the generality
of this system. Our testing environment includes a 64-core
server containing 1 TB of RAM, which we use to model
both the Generator and Outsourcing Proxy parties. We run
separate programs for the Generator and Outsourcing Proxy,
giving them each 32 threads. For the evaluator, we use a
Samsung Galaxy Nexus phone with a 1.2 GHz dual-core
ARM Cortex-A9 and 1 GB of RAM running Android 4.0,
connected to the server through an 802.11 54 Mbps WiFi in
an isolated environment. In our testing we also use a single
server process as the evaluator. For these tests we create that
process on our 64-core server as well. We ran the CMTB
implementation for comparison tests under the same setup.
6.1 Execution Time
The PartialGC system is particularly well suited to com-
plex computations that require multiple stages and the sav-
ing of intermediate state. Previous garbled circuit execution
systems have focused on single-transaction evaluations, such
as computing the “millionaires” problem (i.e., a joint evalua-
tion of which party inputs a greater value without revealing
the values of the inputs) or evaluating an AES circuit.
Our evaluation considers two comparisons: the improve-
ment of our system compared with CMTB without reusing
saved values, and comparing our protocol for saving and
reusing values against CMTB if such reuse was implemented
in that protocol. We also benchmark the overhead for sav-
ing and loading values on a per-bit basis for 256 circuits, a
necessary number to achieve a security parameter of 2−80
in the malicious model. In all cases, we run 10 iterations of
each test and give timing results with 95% confidence inter-
vals. Other than varying the number of circuits our system
parameters are set for 80-bit security.
The programs used for our evaluation are exemplars of
differing input sizes and differing circuit complexities:
Keyed Database: In this program, one party enters a database
and keys to it while the other party enters a key that indexes
into the database, receiving a database entry for that key.
This is an example of a program expressed as a small circuit
that has a very large amount of input.
Matrix Multiplication: Here, both parties enter 32-bit
numbers to fill a matrix. Matrix multiplication is performed
before the resulting matrix is output to both parties. This
is an example of a program with a large amount of inputs
with a large circuit.
Edit (Levenstein) Distance: This program finds the dis-
tance between two strings of the same length and returns
the difference. This is an example of a program with a small
number of inputs and a medium sized circuit.
Millionaires: In this classic SFE program, both parties en-
ter a value, and the result is a one-bit output to each party
to let them know whether their value is greater or smaller
than that of the other party. This is an example of a small
circuit with a large amount of input.
Gate counts for each of our programs can be found in Ta-
ble 1. The only difference for the programs described above
is the additional of a MAC function in PartialGC. We dis-
cuss the reason for this check in Section 6.4.
Table 2 shows the results from our experimental tests. In
the best case, execution time was reduced by a factor of
32 over CMTB, from 1200 seconds to 38 seconds, a 96%
speedup over CMTB. Ultimately, our results show that our
system outperforms CMTB when the input checks are the
bottleneck. This run-time improvement is due to improve-
ments we added from sS13 and occurs in the keyed database,
millionaires, and matrix multiplications programs. In the
other program, edit distance, the input checks are not the
bottleneck and PartialGC does not outperform CMTB. The
total run-time increase for the edit distance problem is due
to overhead of using the new sS13 OT cut-and-choose tech-
nique which requires sending each gate to the evaluator for
check circuits and evaluation circuits. This is discussed fur-
ther in Section 6.4. The typical use case we imagine for our
system, however, is more like the keyed database program,
which has a large amount of inputs and a very small circuit.
We expand upon this use case later in this section.
Reusing Values
For a test of our system’s wire saving capabilities we tested
a dynamic programming problem, longest common substring,
in both PartialGC and CMTB. This program determines
the length of the longest common substring between two
strings. Rather than use a single computation for the solu-
tion, our version incrementally adds a single bit of input to
both strings each time the computation is run and outputs
the results each time to the evaluator. We believe this is
a realistic comparison to a real-world application that in-
crementally adds data during each computation where it is
faster to save the intermediate state and add to it after see-
ing an intermediate result than rerun the entire computation
many times after seeing the result.
For our testing, PartialGC uses our technique to reuse
CMTB PartialGC
KeyedDB 64 6,080 20,891
KeyedDB 128 12,160 26,971
KeyedDB 256 24,320 39,131
MatrixMult8x8 3,060,802 3,305,113
Edit Distance 128 1,434,888 1,464,490
Millionaires 8192 49,153 78,775
LCS Incremental 128 4,053,870 87,236
LCS Incremental 256 8,077,676 160,322
LCS Incremental 512 16,125,291 306,368
LCS Full 128 2,978,854 -
LCS Full 256 13,177,739 -
Table 1: Non-XOR gate counts for the various circuits. In the first 6 circuits, the difference between CMTB and PartialGC
gate counts is in the consistency checks. The explanation for the difference in size between the incremental versions of longest
common substring (LCS) is given in Reusing Values.
16 Circuits 64 Circuits 256 Circuits
CMTB PartialGC CMTB PartialGC CMTB PartialGC
KeyedDB 64 18 ± 2% 3.5 ± 3% 5.1x 72 ± 2% 8.3 ± 5% 8.7x 290 ± 2% 26 ± 2% 11x
KeyedDB 128 33 ± 2% 4.4 ± 8% 7.5x 140 ± 2% 9.5 ± 4% 15x 580 ± 2% 31 ± 3% 19x
KeyedDB 256 65 ± 2% 4.6 ± 2% 14x 270 ± 1% 12 ± 6% 23x 1200 ± 3% 38 ± 5% 32x
MatrixMult8x8 48 ± 4% 46 ± 4% 1.0x 110 ± 8% 100 ± 7% 1.1x 400 ± 10% 370 ± 5% 1.1x
Edit Distance 128 21 ± 6% 22 ± 3% 0.95x 47 ± 7% 50 ± 9% 0.94x 120 ± 9% 180 ± 6% 0.67x
Millionaires 8192 35 ± 3% 7.3 ± 6% 4.8x 140 ± 2% 20 ± 2% 7.0x 580 ± 1% 70 ± 2% 8.3x
Table 2: Timing results comparing PartialGC to CMTB without saving any values. All times in seconds.
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Figure 4: Results from testing our largest common substring
(LCS) programs for PartialGC and CMTB. This shows
when changing a single input value is more efficient un-
der PartialGC than either CMTB program. CMTB crashed
on running LCS Incremental of size 512 due to memory re-
quirements. We were unable to complete the compilation of
CMTB Full of size 512.
wire values. In CMTB, we save each desired internal bit
under a one-time pad and re-enter them into the next com-
putation, as well as the information needed to decrypt the
ciphertext. We use a MAC (the AES circuit of KSS12) to
verify that the party saving the output bits did not modify
them. We also use AES to generate a one-time pad inside
the garbled circuit. We use AES as this is the only cryp-
tographically secure function used in CMTB. Both parties
enter private keys to the MAC functions. This program is
labeled CMTB-Inc, for CMTB incremental. The size of this
program represents the size of the total strings. We also cre-
ated a circuit that computes the complete longest common
substring in one computation labeled CMTB-Full.
The resulting size of the PartialGC and CMTB circuits
are shown in Table 1, and the results are shown in Figure 4.
This result shows that saving and reusing values in Par-
tialGC is more efficient than completely rerunning the com-
putation. The input consistency check adds considerably to
the memory use on the phone for CMTB-Inc and in the case
of input bit 512, the CMTB-Inc program will not complete.
In the case of the 512-bit CMTB-Full, the program would
not complete compilation in over 42 hours. In our CMTB-
Inc program, we assume the cloud saves the output bits so
that multiple phones can have a shared private key.
Note that the growth of CMTB-Inc and CMTB-Full are
different. CMTB-Full grows at a larger rate (4x for each
2x factor increase) than CMTB-Inc (2x for each 2x factor
increase), implying that although at first it seems more ef-
ficient to rerun the program if small changes are desired in
the input, eventually this will not be the case. Even with a
more efficient AES function, CMTB-Inc would not be faster
as the bottleneck is the input, not the size of the circuit.
The overhead of saving and reusing values is discussed
further in Appendix B.
Outsourcing to a Server Process
PartialGC can be used in other scenarios than just out-
sourcing to a mobile device. It can outsource garbled circuit
evaluation from a single server process and retain perfor-
mance benefits over a single server process of CMTB. For
this experiment the outsourcing party has a single thread.
Table 3 displays these results and shows that in the KeyedDB
256 program, PartialGC has a 92% speedup over CMTB.
As with the outsourced mobile case, keyed database prob-
lems perform particularly well in PartialGC. Because the
computationally-intensive input consistency check is a greater
bottleneck on mobile devices than servers, these improve-
ments for most programs are less dramatic. In particular,
both edit distance and matrix multiplication programs ben-
efit from higher computational power and their bottlenecks
16 Circuits 64 Circuits 256 Circuits
CMTB PartialGC CMTB PartialGC CMTB PartialGC
KeyedDB 64 6.6 ± 4% 1.4 ± 1% 4.7x 27 ± 4% 5.1 ± 2% 5.3x 110 ± 2% 24.9 ± 0.3% 4.4x
KeyedDB 128 13 ± 3% 1.8 ± 2% 7.2x 54 ± 4% 5.8 ± 2% 9.3x 220 ± 5% 27.9 ± 0.5% 7.9x
KeyedDB 256 25 ± 4% 2.5 ± 1% 10x 110 ± 7% 7.3 ± 2% 15x 420 ± 4% 33.5 ± 0.6% 13x
MatrixMult8x8 42 ± 3% 41 ± 4% 1.0x 94 ± 4% 79 ± 3% 1.2x 300 ± 10% 310 ± 1% 0.97x
Edit Distance 128 18 ± 3% 18 ± 3% 1.0x 40 ± 8% 40 ± 6% 1.0x 120 ± 9% 150 ± 3% 0.8x
Millionaires 8192 13 ± 4% 3.2 ± 1% 4.1x 52 ± 3% 8.5 ± 2% 6.1x 220 ± 5% 38.4 ± 0.9% 5.7x
Table 3: Timing results from outsourcing the garbled circuit evaluation from a single server process. Results in seconds.
256 Circuits
CMTB PartialGC
KeyedDB 64 64992308 3590416 18x
KeyedDB 128 129744948 3590416 36x
KeyedDB 256 259250228 3590416 72x
MatrixMult8x8 71238860 35027980 2.0x
Edit Distance 128 2615651 4108045 0.64x
Millionaires 8192 155377267 67071757 2.3x
Table 4: Bandwidth comparison of CMTB and PartialGC.
Bandwidth counted by instrumenting PartialGC to count
the bytes it was sending and receiving and then adding them
together. Results in bytes.
on a server are no longer input consistency; as a result, they
execute faster in CMTB than in PartialGC.
6.2 Bandwidth
Since the main reason for outsourcing a computation is
to save on resources, we give results showing a decrease in
the evaluator’s bandwidth. Bandwidth is counted by making
the evaluator to count the number of bytes PartialGC sends
and receives to either server. Our best result gives a 98%
reduction in bandwidth (see Table 4). For the edit distance,
the extra bandwidth used in the outsourced oblivious trans-
fer for all circuits, instead of only the evaluation circuits,
exceeds any benefit we would otherwise have received.
6.3 Secure Friend Finder
Many privacy-preserving applications can benefit from us-
ing PartialGC to cache values for state. As a case study,
we developed a privacy-preserving friend finder application,
where users can locate nearby friends without any user di-
vulging their exact location. In this application, many differ-
ent mobile phone clients use a consistent generator (a server
application) and outsource computation to a cloud. The gen-
erator must be the same for all computations; the cloud must
be the same for each computation. The cloud and generator
are two different parties. After each computation, the map
is updated when PartialGC saves the current state of the
map as wire labels. Without PartialGC outsourcing values
to the cloud, the wire labels would have to be transferred
directly between mobile devices, making a multi-user appli-
cation difficult or impossible.
We define three privacy-preserving operations that com-
prise the application’s functionality:
MapStart - The three parties (generator, evaluator, cloud)
create a “blank” map region, where all locations in the map
are blank and remain that way until some mobile party sets
a location to his or her ID.
MapSet - The mobile party sets a single map cell to a
new value. This program takes in partial values from the
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Figure 5: Run time comparison of our map programs with
two different map sizes.
generator and cloud and outputs a location selected by the
mobile party.
MapGet - The mobile party retrieves the contents of a sin-
gle map cell. This program retrieves partial values from the
generator and cloud and outputs any ID set for that cell to
the mobile.
In the application, each user using the Secure Friend Finder
has a unique ID that represents them on the map. We divide
the map into “cells”, where each cell is a set amount of area.
When the user presses “Set New Location,” the program will
first look to determine if that cell is occupied. If the cell is
occupied, the user is informed he is near a friend. Otherwise
the cell is updated to contain his user ID and remove his ID
from his previous location. We assume a maximum of 255
friends in our application since each cell in the map is 8 bits.
Figure 5 shows the performance of these programs in the
malicious model with a 2−80 security parameter (evaluated
over 256 circuits). We consider map regions containing both
256 and 2048 cells. For maps of 256 cells, each operation
takes about 30 seconds.1 As there are three operations for
each “Set New Location” event, the total execution time is
about 90 seconds, while execution time for 2048 cells is about
3 minutes. The bottleneck of the 64 and 256 cell maps is the
outsourced oblivious transfer, which is not affected by the
number of cells in the map. The vastly larger circuit associ-
ated with the 2048-cell map makes getting and setting values
slower operations, but these results show such an application
is practical for many scenarios.
Example - As an example, two friends initiate a friend
finder computation using Amazon as the cloud and Face-
book as the generator. The first friend goes out for a coffee
at a cafe´. The second friend, riding his bike, gets a message
1Our 64-cell map, as seen in figure 5, also takes about 30
seconds for each operation.
(a) Location selected. (b) After computation.
Figure 6: Screenshots from our application. (a) shows the
map with radio buttons a user can select to indicate position.
(b) show the result after “set new position” is pressed when
a user is present. The application is set to use 64 different
map locations. Map image from Google Maps.
that his friend is nearby and looks for a few minutes and
finds him in the cafe´. Using this application prevents either
Amazon or Facebook from knowing either user’s location
while they are able to learn whether they are nearby.
6.4 Discussion
Analysis of improvements
We analyzed our results and found the improvements came
from three places: the improved sS13 consistency check, the
saving and reusing of values, and the fixed oblivious trans-
fer. In the case of the sS13 consistency check, there are two
reasons for the improvement: first, there is less network traf-
fic, and second, it uses symmetric key operations instead of
exponentiations. In the case of saving and reusing values,
we save time with the faster input consistency check and by
not requiring a user to recompute a circuit multiple times.
Lastly, we reduced the runtime and bandwidth by fixing
parts of the OOT. The previous outsourced oblivious trans-
fer performed the primitive OT S (S being the number of
circuits) times instead of a single time, which turn forced
many extra exponentiations. Each amount of improvement
varies depending upon the circuit.
Output check
Although the garbled circuit is larger for our output check,
this check performs less cryptographic operations for the
outsourcing party, as the evaluator only has to perform a
MAC on the output of the garbled circuit. We use this check
to demonstrate using a MAC can be an efficient output check
for a low power device when the computational power is not
equivalent across all parties.
Commit Cut-and-Choose vs OT Cut-and-Choose
Our results unexpectedly showed that the sS13 OT cut-
and-choose used in PartialGC is actually slower than the
KSS12 commit cut-and-choose used in CMTB in our ex-
perimental setup. Theoretically, sS13, which requires fewer
cryptographic operations, as it generates the garbled circuit
only once, should be the faster protocol. The difference be-
tween the two cut-and-choose protocols is the network usage
– instead of 2
5
of the circuits (CMTB), all the circuits must
be transmitted in sS13. The sS13 cut-and-choose is required
in our protocol so that the cloud can check that the gener-
ator creates the correct gates.
6.5 Implementation Optimizations
We proceeded to optimize our system in light of the slow-
down we saw when compared to CMTB for circuits with
large amounts of gates. We made the following changes: (1)
turn AES-NI on, as it was not turned on by default in CMTB
(or [27], which CMTB is based on), (2) hand-optimize the
garbled gate generation and evaluation to remove excess
memory operations, (3) remove the need for network I/O for
XOR gates from the underlying implementation (previously,
4 bytes were spuriously transmitted for each XOR gate), (4)
batch process gates to reduce the overhead of networking
for each gate, and (5) remove unnecessary hash calls that
existed in PartialGC as an artifact of being built on CMTB.
6.6 Corrections of Underlying Implementation
We made two corrections to the implementation of Par-
tialGC that are artifacts of the underlying implementations.
The first error was from KSS and while the other was from
CMTB. We performed the following changes: (1) further cor-
rect the OT phase of CMTB and (2) add a missing input
encoding phase that was supposed to exist in KSS. The first
error was straightforward: rather than performing a single
set of OTs and then extending it to all circuits, after the
single set of OTs in CMTB, a matrix transformation was
performed for each circuit (instead of a single matrix trans-
formation). We removed this error and added the necessary
correction, i.e. after the single set of OTs were performed,
the results from the OTs were extended in the same manner
as in our protocol description. To correct the second error,
we added the missing input encoding step for the evalua-
tor’s input. Note that KSS and all subsequent systems built
from it do not have this input encoding. Without the input
encoding, a selective failure attack can be performed easily
by the generator in order to gain information about a single
bit of the evaluator‘s input.
6.7 Results from Correct and More Optimal
Implementation
In Table 5 we present results from the corrected and more
optimal implementation of PartialGC. We observe the fol-
lowing:
1. The program that has a large evaluator’s input and very
little gates is slightly slower due to the fixed OT error
and added input encoding (Millionaires).
2. The program with a large circuit size when compared
with the input sizes of both the generator and evaluator
has improved runtime performance (Edit distance).
3. The program we tested that has high input and also has
a high gate count is improved (Matrix Mult).
4. The program that relies mostly on the generator’s input
size with a low amount of gates is largely unaffected by
the OT change or the added input encoding but is still
improved by the optimizations to the garbled gate run-
time (Keyed DB).
16 Circuits 64 Circuits 256 Circuits
Imp. Orig. Imp. Orig. Imp. Orig.
KeyedDB 64 4 ± 10% 3.5 ± 3% 0.92x 4.4 ± 5% 8.3 ± 5% 1.9x 7.6 ± 6% 26 ± 2% 3.4x
KeyedDB 128 3.8 ± 10% 4.4 ± 8% 1.1x 4.5 ± 8% 9.5 ± 4% 2.1x 8.1 ± 4% 31 ± 3% 3.8x
KeyedDB 256 4.0 ± 4% 4.6 ± 2% 1.1x 4.7 ± 9% 12 ± 6% 2.7x 9.3 ± 4% 38 ± 5% 4.0x
MatrixMult8x8 21 ± 2% 46 ± 4% 2.2x 29 ± 4% 100 ± 7% 3.5x 69 ± 2% 370 ± 5% 5.4x
EditDist 128 7.8 ± 4% 22 ± 3% 2.8x 10 ± 4% 50 ± 9% 4.8x 21 ± 2% 180 ± 6% 8.9x
Millionaires 8192 24 ± 5% 7.3 ± 6% 0.30x 30 ± 3% 20 ± 2% 0.68x 78 ± 3% 70 ± 2% 0.89x
Table 5: Comparing the original PartialGC and the improved version of PartialGC. Results in seconds.
6.8 SFE Engineering Insights
Given our experience from building on other frameworks,
we provide our insights:
1. If runtime results do not describe the intuition of the pro-
tocol then there is most likely something incorrect in the
implementation. For instance, if the average time to eval-
uate garbled gates is greater than the average time to gen-
erate the garbled gates there is most likely a problem in
the garbled circuit evaluation phase.
2. Although comparing the time of garbling and evaluating
can be interesting in its own right, evaluating the total
time of full garbled circuit garbling and evaluation (in-
cluding network overhead) is also insightful as networking
and related operations can be the bottleneck in a practi-
cal system. This includes network usage, the effects of a
cut-and-choose protocol, and the time it takes to get the
next gate from the interpreter or circuit file.
3. When using another implementation, check to verify each
protocol step exists in the implementation.
4. Implementing checks at the circuit layer that are exposed
to an end-user is not worth the time saved by not encoding
them directly into the garbled circuit. This comes from our
experience with our output consistency check, which was
difficult to create correctly for each test program.
5. Ensure that all the features of a developed compiler and
execution system are thoroughly unit tested.
7. RELATED WORK
SFE was first described by Yao in his seminal paper [39]
on the subject. The first general purpose platform for SFE,
Fairplay [32], was created in 2004. Fairplay had both a com-
piler for creating garbled circuits, and a run-time system for
executing them. Computations involving three or more par-
ties have also been examined; one of the earliest examples
is FairplayMP [2]. There have been multiple other imple-
mentations since, in both semi-honest [6, 9, 16, 17, 40] and
malicious settings [26, 37].
Optimizations for garbled circuits include the free-XOR
technique [25], garbled row reduction [36], rewriting compu-
tations to minimize SFE [23], and pipelining [18]. Pipelining
allows the evaluator to proceed with the computation while
the generator is creating gates.
Kreuter et al. [27] included both an optimizing compiler
and an efficient run-time system using a parallelized imple-
mentation of SFE in the malicious model from [37].
The creation of circuits for SFE in a fast and efficient man-
ner is one of the central problems in the area. Previous com-
pilers, from Fairplay to KSS12, were based on the concept of
creating a complete circuit and then optimizing it. PAL [33]
improved such systems by using a simple template circuit,
reducing memory usage by orders of magnitude. PCF [26]
built from this and used a more advanced representation to
reduce the disk space used.
Other methods for performing MPC involve homomorphic
encryption [3, 12], secret sharing [4], and ordered binary
decision diagrams [28]. A general privacy-preserving com-
putation protocol that uses homomorphic encryption and
was designed specifically for mobile devices can be found
in [7]. There are also custom protocols designed for partic-
ular privacy-preserving computations; for example, Kamara
et al. [21] showed how to scale server-aided Private Set In-
tersection to billion-element sets with a custom protocol.
Previous reusable garbled-circuit schemes include that of
Branda˜o [5], which uses homomorphic encryption, Gentry
et al. [10], which uses attribute-based functional encryption,
and Goldwasser et al. [13], which introduces a succinct func-
tional encryption scheme. These previous works are purely
theoretical; none of them provides experimental performance
analysis. There is also recent theoretical work on reusing
encrypted garbled-circuit values [30, 11, 31] in the ORAM
model; it uses a variety of techniques, including garbled cir-
cuits and identity-based encryption, to execute the underly-
ing low-level operations (program state, read/write queries,
etc.). Our scheme for reusing encrypted values is based on
completely different techniques; it enables us to do new kinds
of computations, thus expanding the set of things that can
be computed using garbled circuits.
The Quid-Pro-Quo-tocols system [19] allows fast execu-
tion with a single bit of leakage. The garbled circuit is ex-
ecuted twice, with the parties switching roles in the latter
execution, then running a secure protocol to ensure that the
output from both executions are equivalent; if this fails, a
single bit may be leaked due to the selective failure attack.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents PartialGC, a server-aided SFE scheme
allowing the reuse of encrypted values to save the costs of in-
put validation and to allow for the saving of state, such that
the costs of multiple computations may be amortized. Com-
pared to the server-aided outsourcing scheme by CMTB, we
reduce costs of computation by up to 96% and bandwidth
costs by up to 98%. Future work will consider the general-
ity of the encryption re-use scheme to other SFE evaluation
systems and large-scale systems problems that benefit from
the addition of state, which can open up new and intriguing
ways of bringing SFE into the practical realm.
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APPENDIX
A. CMTB PROTOCOL
As we are building off of the CMTB garbled circuit exe-
cution system, we give an abbreviated version of the proto-
col. In our description we refer to the generator, the cloud,
and the evaluator. The cloud is the party the evaluator out-
sources her computation to.
Circuit generation and check: The template for the gar-
bled circuit is augmented to add one-time XOR pads on the
output bits and split the evaluator’s input wires per the in-
put encoding scheme. The generator generates the necessary
garbled circuits and commits to them and sends the com-
mitments to the evaluator. The generator then commits to
input labels for the evaluator’s inputs.
CMTB relies on Goyal et al.’s [14] random seed check,
which was implemented by Kreuter et al. [27] to combat
generation of incorrect circuits. This technique uses a cut-
and-choose style protocol to determine whether the genera-
tor created the correct circuits by creating and committing
to many different circuits. Some of those circuits are used
for evaluation, while the others are used as check circuits.
Evaluator’s inputs: Rather than a two-party oblivious
transfer, we perform a three-party outsourced oblivious trans-
fer. An outsourced oblivious transfer is an OT that gets the
select bits from one party, the wire labels from another, and
returns the selected wire labels to a third party. The party
that selects the wire labels does not learn what the wire la-
bels are, and the party that inputs the wire labels does not
learn which wire was selected; the third party only learns
the selected wire labels. In CMTB, the generator offers up
wire labels, the evaluator provides the select bits, and the
cloud receives the selected labels. CMTB uses the Ishai OT
extension [20] to reduce the number of OTs.
CMTB uses an encoding technique from Lindell and Pinkas
[29], which prevents the generator from finding out any in-
formation about the evaluator’s input if a selective failure
attack transpires. CMTB also uses the commitment tech-
nique of Kreuter et al. [27] to prevent the generator from
swapping the two possible outputs of the oblivious transfer.
To ensure the evaluator’s input is consistent across all cir-
cuits, CMTB uses a technique from Lindell and Pinkas [29],
whereby the inputs are derived from a single oblivious trans-
fer.
Generator’s input and consistency check: The gener-
ator sends his input to the cloud for the evaluation circuits.
Then the generator, evaluator, and cloud all work together
to prove the input consistency of the generator’s input. For
the generator’s input consistency check, CMTB uses the
malleable-claw free construction from shelat and Shen [37].
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Figure 7: The amount of time it takes to save and load a bit
in PartialGC when using 256 circuits.
Circuit evaluations: The cloud evaluates the garbled cir-
cuits marked for evaluation and checks the circuits marked
for checking. The cloud enters in the generator and eval-
uator’s input into each garbled circuit and evaluates each
circuit. The output for any particular bit is then the ma-
jority output between all evaluator circuits. The cloud then
recreates each check circuit. The cloud creates the hashes of
each garbled circuit and sends those hashes to the evaluator.
The evaluator then verifies the hashes are the same as the
ones the generator previously committed to.
Output consistency check and output: The three par-
ties prove together that the cloud did not modify the output
before she sent it to the generator or evaluator. Both the
evaluator and generator receive their respective outputs. All
outputs are blinded by the respective party’s one-time pad
inside the garbled circuit to prevent the cloud from learning
what any output bit represents.
CMTB uses the XOR one-time pad technique from Ki-
raz [24] to prevent the evaluator from learning the gener-
ator’s real output. To prevent output modification, CMTB
uses the witness-indistinguishable zero-knowledge proof from
Kreuter et al. [27].
B. OVERHEAD OF REUSING VALUES
We created several versions of the keyed database program
to determine the runtime of saving and loading the database
on a per bit basis using our system (See Figure 7). This
figure shows it is possible to save and load a large amount
of saved wire labels in a relatively short time. The time to
load a wire label is larger than the time to save a value since
saving only involves saving the wire label to a file and loading
involves reading from a file and creating the partial input
gates. Although not shown in the figure, the time to save or
load a single bit also increases with the circuit parameter.
This is because we need S copies of that bit - one for every
circuit.
C. EXAMPLE PROGRAM
In this section we describe the execution of an attendance
application. Consider a scenario where the host wants each
user to sign in from their phones to keep a log of the guests,
but also wants to keep this information secret.
This application has three distinct programs. The first
program initializes a counter to a number input by the eval-
uator. The second program, which is used until the last pro-
gram is called, takes in a name and increments the counter
by one. The last program outputs all names and returns the
count of users. For this application, users (specifically, their
mobile phones) assume the role of evaluators in the protocol
(Section 4).
First, the host runs the initial program to initialize a
database. We cannot execute the second program to add
names to the log until this is done, lest we reveal that there
is no memory saved (i.e., there is no one else present).
Protocol in Brief: In this first program, the cut-and-choose
OT is executed to select the circuit split (the circuits that
are for evaluation and generation). Both parties save the de-
cryption keys: the cloud saves the keys attained from the OT
and the generator saves both possible keys that could have
been selected by the cloud. The evaluator performs the OOT
with the other parties to input the initial value into the pro-
gram. There is no input by the generator so the generator’s
input check does not execute. There is no partial input so
that phase of the protocol is skipped. The garbled circuit to
set the initial value is executed; while there is no output to
the generator or evaluator, a partial output is produced: the
cloud saves the garbled wire value, which it possesses, and
the generator saves both possible wire values (the generator
does not know what value the cloud has, and the cloud does
not know what the value it has saved actually represents).
The cloud also saves the circuit split.
Saved memory after the program execution (when the
evaluator inputs 0 as the initial value):
Count
0
Saved Guests
Guest 1 then enters the building and executes the pro-
gram, entering his name (“Guest 1”) as input.
Protocol in Brief for Second Program: In this second
program, the cut-and-choose OT is not executed. Instead,
both the generator and cloud load the saved decryption key
values, hash them, and use those values for the check and
evaluation circuit information (instead of attaining new keys
through an OT, which would break security). The new keys
are saved, and the evaluator then performs the OOT for in-
put. The generator does not have any input in this program
so the check for the generator’s input is skipped. Since there
exists a partial input, the generator loads both possible wire
values and creates the partial input gates. The cloud loads
the attained values, receives the partial input gates from
the generator, and then executes (and checks) the partial
input gates to receive the garbled input values. The garbled
circuit is then executed and partial output saved as before
(although there is more data to save for this program as
there is a name present in the database).
After executing the second program the memory is as fol-
lows:
Count
1
Saved Guests
Guest1
Guest 2 then enters the dwelling and runs the program.
The execution is similar to the previous one (when Guest 1
entered), except that it’s executed by Guest 2’s phone.
At this point, the memory is as follows:
Count
2
Saved Guests
Guest1
Guest2
Guest 3 then enters the dwelling and executes the program
as before. At this point, the memory is as follows:
Count
3
Saved Guests
Guest1
Guest2
Guest3
Finally, the host runs the last program that outputs the
count and the guests in the database. In this case the count
is 3 and the guests are Guest1, Guest2, and Guest3.
